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I.  Introduction'
As  it  is well known,  an  unfunded  pension  scheme constitutes  a  obligation  towards
current  retirees and workers  (a contingent  liability),  and thus is equivalent to  a hidden public
debt.  Shifting to a funded scheme makes this high  implicit debt explicit, which  has eventually
to be repaid.  For this very reason, countries generally have been reluctant to  undertake  such a
reform  approach  since  repayment  of  this  debt  amounts  to  a  reversal  of  the  initial
intergenerational  redistribution,  shifting  income  back  from  the  current  to  the  future
generations  and  raising the  issue of the  double  burden  on the  transition  generation.  This
double burden  is unavoidable unless the economic  externalities  of the reform  such as fewer
distortions  in  labor  and  saving  decisions  or  more  efficient financial  markets  allow for  a
compensation  of the transition  generation, and there  are indications that this  may be the case
(Holzmann,  1997a). In the context  of an aging population,  a double burden may be justified if
it leads to a more equitable intergenerational  income  distribution.
This paper concentrates primarily  on the mechanics of financing the transition,  and on
the  financial  stocks  and  flows  involved.  Only  if  the  problem  is  treated  in  a  consistent
stock/flow  concept  can the  true  costs  or  benefits  of  transition,  and  its  economic  and
distributive implications be fully assessed. To this end, the structure  of the paper is as follows:
Section II elaborates on the appropriate  definition  of the scope of the obligations that become
explicit, the way these are measured and how they  change under  reform.  Section III presents
the main strategies for reducing the debt to be made explicit. Section IV highlights the changes
in the composition  of total  (i.e. implicit and  explicit) debt and the related fiscal requirements
during the transition  under alternative  reforms.  Section V presents the options  to finance the
transition  through  debt or budgetary  financing.
II.  Defining,  Measuring,  and  Changing  the  Stock of Liabilities
There is surprising confusion  about what  constitutes  the appropriate concept to  define
and measure the stock of liabilities that potentially  become explicit and have to be repaid.  This
chapter attempts a clarification, develops a thumb-rule  to estimate the accrued to  date liabilities
- the relevant definition -, and presents  simulations  on how these liabilities are influenced by
policy reforms.
Defining  the scope of pension  liabilities  - alternative  definitions
There exist three main definitions  of pension liabilities, i.e. the stock of commitment  (Franco,
1995)  :2
' This paper draws heavily on Holzmann  (1997c), but contains  also extensions and  corrections.  It has profited
from valuable comments  by Roberto  Rocha, Robert  Palacios  and Anita  Schwarz-  The remaining errors  are all
my doing.
2 For  an  alternative  terminology  on  pension  liabilities taken  from  the  US private  sector  context  and  further
considerations,  see Kane and  Palacios  (1997).  There  the  roughly  equivalent  concepts are  named:  (a) accrued
termination  liability;  (b) present value of  anticipated  benefit  payments  to  current  participants;  and  (c) "going
concern" liability.4
(a)  Accrued-to-date  liabilities: these represent the present value of pensions to be paid in
the future on the basis of accrued  rights; neither the future contributions, nor the accrual of
new rights they imply are considered.
(b)  Current workers and pensioner's liabilities:  in this case it is assumed that pension
schemes continue their  existence  until the  last contributor dies, while no new entrants are
allowed;  both the future contribution of existing members and their new rights are therefore
allowed  under current rules.
(c)  Open-system liabilities: these also include the  present value of  contributions and
pensions  of new workers under current rules; the range of options extends from including  only
children not yet in the labor force,  to an infinite perspective.
Table 1 highlights the  interrelation between the  alternative definitions of pension's
liabilities,  the corresponding  and alternatively vsed concept of social security debt or wealth,
and the concept of actuarial deficit,  the balancing  item. The difference  between the three main
definitions of pension liabilities reflects alternative views of which generations, and their
claims, should be considered. The difference  between the gross and net concept results from
taking account of assets (financial  reserves and present value of future contributions); the net
concept  is equivalent  to the balancing  item, the actuarial  deficit.  The concept of debt or wealth
represents alternative  views from the side of government (debt) or individuals (wealth). For
example, the gross social security debt of the current generation (as seen from government)
corresponds  to the gross social  security wealth (as  seen from the individuals);  and the net social
security wealth corresponds to the actuarial deficit of the current generation. The concept of
net/gross social security wealth was introduced into  the  pension discussion by  Feldstein
(1974)3.
For  an unfunded/fully funded pension shift (UF-FF shift), it is the  first definition
which  is relevant, since it  is the  value  of  accrued rights which  has  to  be potentially
compensated  and thus becomes explicit debt (unless the government defaults on its pension
commitments).  For a given pension system, the main economic  assumptions which determine
the level of the accrued pension liabilities (or social security debt I, henceforth SSD) are the
real interest rate, real wage growth, inflation rate, and survival probabilities.  For countries
where the public pension system has accumulated  financial  reserves,  the existing assets  have to
be subtracted.
Measuring the Social  Security Debt
As noted above,  the accrued-to-date  liabilities  represent the present value of pensions to
be paid in the future on the basis of accrued rights.  The measurement is relatively easy for
those already retired, but requires stronger assumptions  for those currently in the labor force.
For  example, how should one calculate the  accrued rights of a worker  with  10 years of
contributions, if the eligibility  requirement is 15  years, the annual  accrual rate is higher for the
first 20 years, and the assessed  income is that of the best 10 contribution years yet to come?
There is no best answer and often pro-rata apportioning is undertaken, i.e. the full pension is
apportioned according to  the  actual length  of  the  contribution  record.  If  the  actual
3  In  the  steady state, with  an actuariallv fair pension  system without financial  reserves, both accrued-to-date
liabilities  (the gross social  security debt 1 and the net-social  wealth coincide  since the present value of further
liabilities  resulting  from future contributions and the present  value of future contributions cancel  out.5
compensation  paid  for the transition to a funded scheme  differs,  this would have to show-up as
valuation adjustments.
Table  1.  Alternative  Definitions  of Pension Liabilities/  Social Security Debts
or Social Security Wealths/Actuarial  Deficits and their  Interrelation
Assets  Liabilities  Detinition of  Balance  Detinition  of Liability
Financial reserves  Present value of pensions
in disbursement
Actuarial Deficit I  Present value of future
pensions due to past contri-
butions of current workers
Uross  Social Security Debt I  Gross Social Security Debt I  Actuarial Deict  IAccrued  to Da
L__  Liability
Present value of future  Present value of future
contributions of current  pensions due to future
workers  contributions of current
workers
Actuarial  Deficit  11
-iross  Social Secunty Debt 11  Dross Social Security Debt 11
(iross Social Security Debt  (ross  Social Security Debt  Actuarial Dencit 1+11  Current Workers and
of Current Generation  of Current Generation  Net Social Securit  Pensioner's  Liability| L~~  Wealth/Debtl
Present value of contributions  Present value of pensions
of future generations  due to contributions of
future generations
Actuarial Deficit III
Dross Social Security Debt  Dross Social Security  Debt
of Future Generation  of Future Generation
D3ross  Social Security Debt  ross Socal  Security Debt  Actuaral Deicit l+1+111  =-  Open  System
of all Generations  of all Generations  Total Actuarial  Deficiq  Liabilit
Source:  Own  preseniation.
Estimating the accrued-to-date liabilities (the implicit debt) should be part-and-parcel of
any projection model of pension reform.  The PROST  model of the  World Bank contains such
estimations, and model simulations highlight,  as to  be expected, the  main assumptions  which
determine the size in percent  of GDP:  the population  structure, pension coverage, and benefit
level; indexation arrangements, the difference between the wage growth  and inflation;  and the
rate of discount.  For the latter, the market-determined  costs of government  borrowing  -- the
interest  rate? - should  be taken  as this is price  which  the government  has to  pay  once the
implicit  debt is made explicit.  While a higher  interest  reduces the  estimated implicit  debt it
increases the  interest  payments  on  the  explicit  debt,  and under  the  appropriate  financing
arrangement, elaborated below, the impact on government budget cancels out.6
For a mature unfunded pension system, a rough rule-of-thumb  can be used to capture
the size of implicit debt in percent of GDP as a multiple of annual pension expenditure in
percent of GDP. The upper estimate  of this multiple is derived under the assumption of wage
growth equal to  the  interest rate.  With, on  average,  some  10 to  20 years expected in
retirement,  the accrued  liabilities  amounts to 5 to 10  times the annual expenditure since half of
the retirement  has already passed. In addition, the accrued  liabilities  with regard to the current
working generations have to be taken into account.  With some 30 to  40 years of average
activity, the accrued obligation amounts to  some 15 to  20 times the  annual expenditure.
Taking both upper estimates  for the retired and working generation together results in accrued
obligations of  30  times  the  annual  expenditure; a  lower  estimate is  20  times  annual
expenditure. Of course, price indexation  instead of wage  indexation or a positive interest-wage
growth difference  reduces  this estimate,  while an aging  population increases  it.
Table 2 illustrates the scope of the SSD for selected OECD countries in  1990. The
estimates have only  illustrative character and  constitute a  lower bound,  since they  often
concentrate on the main schemes only (disregarding,  for example, civil servants' pensions),
leave out disability and survivors  pensions, or ignore social pensions and means-tested and
related supplements 4, and differ from other estimates  in methodology and assumptions (see,
Van den Noord and Hurd, 1994,  OECD 1996,  Kane and Palacios, 1997). Nevertheless, those
estimates  indicate  that the hidden  public debt, the SSD,  is extremely important and dwarfs the
explicit  financial  debt existing  in those countries. Comparing  the SSD  with the annual pension
expenditure  also confirms a rule of thumb that for reasonable  parameter assumptions  the ratio
is in the range  of 20 to 30.
Table 2:  Net Accrued Pension Liabilities and Financial Debt for Selected OECD Countries, 1990
(in percent of GDP)
Country  Gross Liabilities  |  Existing  Net  Pension  Gross Liabilit./  Financial  Total gross
Retired  Workforce  Total  Assets  Liabilities  Expend. 1/  Pension Exp.  Liabilities  Liabilities
(1)  (2)  3) =(I)+(2'  (4)  (5)=(3)-(4)  (6)  (7)  (3)/(6)  (8)  (9)=(3)+(8)
France  77  139'  216  0  216  9,0  24,0  40  256
Germnany  55  102  157  0  157  6,9  22,8  44  201
Italy  94  165  259  0  259  10,6  24,4  101  360
(after 1992 reform)  94,  148  242  0  242  10.,6  22,8  101  343
United Kingdom  58,  81  139  0  139  6,6  21.1  35  174
Canada  42  71  113  8  105  3,9  29,0  73  186
Japan  51  112  163  18  145  5.7  28,6  70  233
Unites States  42  70  112  23  89,0  5,1  22,0  55  167
Assumptions: Pension benefits are price indexed; real earnings grow by 2 percent;
discount rate is selected at 4 percent from 1990 to 2010. declinding to 3 percent in 2050.
Source:  Van den Noord and Herd (1994), OECD data base. and own calculations.
11  OnIx old-age pension expenditure around 1990; figures for Japan include survivors and disability pensions.
4  The  overall  pension  expenditure  in most  OECD  countries  are much higher  and  national  estimates  of the  (net)
social security  debt  arrive  at values  which  are up to  50 percent  above  the  presented  ones  (see Franco,  1995).7
Social  Security Debt, Pension Expenditure and Policy Reforms
The size of the SSD at any moment  is very sensitive to policy changes and shifts in the
demographic  and  economic  environment  since the  impact  on  current  and  future  benefit
streams is immediately capitalized.  In contrast, current  expenditures  react only  to  changes in
current events.  This difference is important  in order to gauge the need of reform, the effects of
different policy  options,  and the impact  on the fiscal requirements  of moving toward  funded
provisions.
Figure  la  and  b sketches the  scope  and  changes of the  SSD under  different  benefit
reform options,  and Figure  ic the divergence in development  betweern  .ocks  and flows.  The
results are based on a heuristic overlapping  generation-type  simulation model that  mimics the
essential features of an unfunded, two-tier pension scheme 5:
Benefit indexation  (Figure la):  Starting out with price indexation under  the base-line scenario
(implying a steady-state SSD of some 160 percent of GDP),  with  a change to wage indexation
in period 0, the SSD jumps immediately  by over 20 percent  of GDP and  continues  further to
increase for some 30 years till the difference to the baseline scenario reaches almost 40 percent
of GDP,  or  1/5  of the  original  SSD level.  With  initial  wage indexation,  a change  to  price
indexation in period 0 leads to an immediate drop in the SSD level by some 24 percent  of GDP
before gradually approaching the baseline level after some 40 years.
Retirement  age and  accrual rate  (Figure lb):  Changing the retirement  age from  60 to  65, or
even from  60 to  70 dulring the  periods  1 to  20 has an  effect on  the  SSD well  before the
implementation  of the reform, and the long-term impact on SSD is substantial.  However,  the
results also reveal that in an earnings-relatpJ scheme the effects are somewhat  compensated if
the accrual rate is not adjusted accordingly ki.e.  if individuals  working longer and retiring  later
accrue further  pension  rights).  Linking  a  strong increase  in the  RA  with  a  decrease in the
accrual rate essentially halves the SSD.
Both changes in policy parameters  and their effects on SSD are a first indication  of the
importance  of introducing  policy  changes well in advance  of a UF-FF  shift  if the  transition
costs are to be minimized.  Figure  la also indicates the increase of the SSD as a result of rising
life expectancy (as of period  1).  Again, SSD jumps with  the  future change in life-expectancy,
i.e., the  stock  effects of future  changes are immediately  capitalized.  Figure  lc  exhibits  this
difference between stock and flow developments with  regard to  SSD and pension  expenditure
(each measured as a percent of GDP).  While the fiscal flow variable -the pension  expenditure -
is initially identical, differences in future  life expectancy and policy setting  have an immediate
impact on SSD.  The initial difference amounts to almost 30 percent of GDP.
The  model  has  been  calibrated  to reflect  economies  with a comprehensive  two-tier  pension  system  consisting  of
a basic  tier and an earnings-related  tier. Under  the base-line  assumption,  the life-expectancy  (LE)  is 70 years,  the
basic  tier amounts  to 20  percent  of average  wage,  the accrual  rate in the earnings-related  tier to 1.5%  p.a.,  and the
retirement  age  is 60. The model  assumptions  imply  a gross  wage  share  of 44 percent  of GDP and this results  in
an average  replacement  rate of some  50%  (net of contribution  payments),  a contribution  rate on net wages  of
some  30  percent,  and an expenditure  share  of some  9%  of GDP. The baseline  scenario  implies  a SSD  of some  163
percent  of GDP, with a real  interest  -real  growth  rate  differential  of 3pp. Reducing  this gap  to 2pp increases  the
SSD  by some 30pp  of GDP. For the motivation  of the specific  model  approach  and basic  model features,  see
Holzmann  (1997c).8
Figure Ia: Social Security  Debt under  Alternative  Policy
Scenarios  I
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Figure lb:  Social Security Debt under Alternative Policy Scenarios
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Figure Ic: Social  Security  Debt  and Pension  Expenditure
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Ill.  Strategies  for Limiting  the Debt to be made Explicit
Given the actual pension expenditure  level in OECD  countries and in the emerging
market economies of Eastern Europe and Latin America of  5 to  15 percent of GDP, this
amounts to  a SSD of some 100 to 300 percent of GDP, and sometimes above, with  rising
tendency due to population aging.  Making the debt of such an amount fully explicit, and
eventually having  to repay it, may often be not feasible. This begs  for strategies  to reduce the
amount of SSD  made explicit. The main strategies,  which can be applied simultaneously,  are
fourfold and differ in their impact  on the net-asset  position of government.
Strategy  I consists  of a partial shift towards a funded system,  thereby making only part
of the SSD explicit. The resulting  mandatory pension scheme consists of an unfunded and a
funded  pillar,  and  the  distribution  between  both  is  determined  by  fiscal and  other
considerations. Such an approach  is applied in Argentina and other Latin American  countries,
and is under preparation or implementation in Eastern European reform countries such as
Hungary, Poland, and Croatia. All things equal,  this strategy does not change  the overall  level
of debt nor the net asset-position  of government; it only reduces the about of implicit debt
made explicit.
Strategy  II consists  in reducing  the SSD  via a reduction of future commitments  through
an increase in the  retirement age, decrease in  the  annual accrual factor or  change in  the
indexation  procedure (say,  from wage  to price indexation). In fiscal  parlance,  the government
partially defaults on its pension commitments.  The reduction in  total debt improves the
balance  sheet of government.
A reform of the unfunded scheme in parallel with a partial or full shift to a funded
scheme appears required  in  most countries  since the  unfunded  schemes are  essentially
financially  unsustainable,  and a mere shift in the financing mechanism is of little help. So far,
all reform countries in Latin America have adjusted eligibility and benefit rules before or in
parallel with a shift in the financing  mechanism.  In order to reduce the amount of SSD made
explicit,  the reform has to be implemented  as early as possible.
Table 3 attempts to summarize  the reform-induced  changes in the composition of the
SSD for Chile and Colombia.  Both reforms entail a similar estimated level of the SSD  to  be
made explicit, and  in  both  countries the  corresponding fiscal flows are predominantly
generated  by the operational  deficit.
Strategy III  consists in  applying  an  expenditure-minimizing procedure  for  the
determination of the  compensatory amount for those individuals willing to  switch to  the
funded scheme,  and hence forgoing  the benefits of the unfunded one.'  The move to a funded
scheme which promises a higher rate of return  (and hence a higher benefit level for a given
contribution rate, or  an equal benefit level for a lower contribution  rate) suggests  that  no
compensation  for a major segment of the age cohorts is at all required. If, despite  the lower
contribution record, the higher rate of return under the funded scheme allows  the individual
to achieve  a benefit level at least as high as remaining with the unfunded scheme, he has an
6  Palacios  and  Whitehouse  (1998)  provide  a  switching  analysis  and  review  the  empirical  evidence  from  ten
countries.11
incentive to  switch  to  the  new scheme  without  any  compensation.  Figure  2 highlights  the
interest rate-wage growth rate differential required in order to induce an age cohort  (consisting
of identical  individuals  with  perfect  foresight,  hence  abstracting  from  uncertainty  and  risk
aversion, but  including survivor probabilities,  and a potential  span of activity between  age 21
to 60/65/70,  and of retirement between  age 61/66/71  and 100) to switch to the funded scheme.
The results suggest that  for  reasonable  rate'  differentials  (in the  range of 1.5 to  3 percentage
points) no  compensation  for  individuals  in  the  age range of 33 and 44 (and below)  may be
required.
Table 3.  Shifting from Unfunded  to Funded Pensions: .The Restructuring of SSD
Chile  (1981)  Colombia (1994)
(in % of GDP)  (in % of GDP)
Social Security Debt
of unreformed  system  195.011/  125.7 2/
-reform of
unfunded scheme  -32.0l  -37.6 3/
- reformed
unfunded  scheme  -37.0 4/  4.5
Social Security Debt  in percent  in percent
made explicit  126.01  100%  83,6  100%
operational  deficit 5/  99.91  79%  69,2  83%
compensation  amount  5/  26.1,  21%  14,4  17%
1/  Estimated from annual expenditure prior  to reform  (7.8 percent) times 25.
2/  Estimated from accumulated deficits under alternative scenario simulations and the
assumption of interest
rate equal the growth  rate.  See Schmidt-Hebbel (1995).
3/  Includes effects from higher contribution  rates beside increased retirement age and
changes in benefit structure.
4/  Estimate for unfunded scheme of security forces and minimum  pension guarantee.
5/  Estimated from discounted flow projections  and interest/growth  rate equality
assumption.
Source: Arrau (1992), Schmidt-Hebbel (1995), and own calculations.
The resulting savings, however,  are likely to be small, or actually may be non-existent.
On the one hand, the present value of future benefit claims of that age segment is modest. On
the  other  hand,  a compensation  at  the  present  value  level  of  future  benefit  claims  would
actually increase the total  debt.  The switching  of this  age group takes place because they can12
buy the same level of annuity at a lower price.  An additional compensation would further
increase their  welfare position.  A  fiscal neutral transition in  the absence of externalities
implies that the welfare  position of individuals  is not enhanced. This requires that original
income (welfare)  position is reestablished  through additional taxes. The lower annuity price
necessitates the  levying of  an additional a  wage tax  equal to  the  difference of  the  old
contribution rate and the premium rate required to achieve  the old benefit level in order to
finance the true transition deficit (discussed  below).  A compensation for forgone benefits
would necessitate  an additional  tax of equal present value but increase  temporarily the total
(implicit  and explicit)  debt.
Yet savings  may occur  if the risk of the implicit rate of return of unfunded schemes is
taken into account.  In financially unsustainable  schemes there is high policy risk to  the
individual that future benefit  levels will be reduced. This risk is likely to increase  with (i) the
current  debt level, and (ii) the projected general government deficits.  While the returns  of
funded schemes are also risky, a compensation of acquired rights with explicit government
bonds - a, perhaps, much less riskier asset - may allow a discount on  the  face value of
statutory future benefits.
Figure  2: Switching Age without Compensation
and Required Interest-Wage Rate Differential
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Strategy IV consists in swapping the implicit debt with  government assets.  In countries
with  assets to  be privatized the option  of a direct swap has been raised, or  at least the use of
privatization  proceeds to  cover the  "costs" of transition.  At  the macroeconomic  level, the
scope  of  assets to  be  swapped  against  existing  SSD  appears  limited  even  for  economies
transforming  from  100 percent public  ownership,  with  estimated swap ratios  ranging from
some  3 to  70 percent  with  most  countries  in  the  lower  range (Holzmann,  1994).  At  the
microeconomic  level a direct swap raises issues of liquidity  of the  assets to  pay  annuities,  of13
corporate governance  since pension funds are traditionally not equipped to  run enterprises,
and asset diversification  of the emerging  funds since all the assets would initially be held in
equities.  Yet, as the  example of Bolivia indicates privatization assets can be used in  an
innovative way to finance  a (modest)  universal  basic  pension.
In  contrast to  swaps, privatization proceeds are scheduled in  most countries to  co-
finance the  fiscal requirements of  transition (for example in  Argentina, Mexico, Poland,
Kazakhstan,  and Croatia). The projections,  however, indicate the amounts will be modest and
time-bound, reaching  at most one or two percent of GDP annually for a period of 5 to  10
years. While modest,  these contributions appear important for reducing  the political  resistance
against  such a reform.
While the use of privatization assets  contributes to a reduction of financing  needs when
the debt is made explicit, it does not improve the net-asset  position of the government. The
privatization proceeds could  have also been used to  retire  public debt  to  shorten  the
asset/liability balance  while leaving  the net-asset  position unchanged.  An improvement of the
latter requires an improved fiscal  stance through higher taxes or lower expenditure, discussed
below.
IV.  Changes in the Composition of Debt and Fiscal  Requirements
In the discussion  of pension reforms the costs of transition are often equated  with the
fiscal requirements to  finance the implicit debt made explicit.  These fiscal requirements
essentially  emerge in the form of the operational deficit in the unfunded scheme due to the
shortfall of those contributons which have been diverted, and in the form of compensation
payments for forgone benefits of the switchers. Yet, the financing of these fiscal needs itself
does not  constitute an economic cost; it  reflects financial flows linked with  change in  the
composition of total public debt.  Under some assumptions,  no economic costs (or benefits)
emerge.
This chapter highlights how the fiscal requirements are impacted by  the  speed of
transition and by the form of disbursing  compensation  payments, and presents the importance
of an early reform  of the unfunded scheme  to reduce the overall debt.
(i)  The speed of transition is determined by the decision at which age a switch to  the
funded scheme  should take place. There are two extreme options: Under the radical  option,
all commitments - for those who have just entered the labor force to  those who are already
retired - are compensated. Thus, the total SSD is made explicit in one stroke and has to be
financed on the  financial market; the  cash flow requirements equal the  SSD.  Under the
minimal option, only the new entrants to the labor market participate in the funded scheme.
This  reduces the  cash flow  requirements to  the  rising operational deficit (the difference
between revenue and expenditure). since the expenditure remains for many years while the
contributions decrease  continuously. As a result, the transition is only completed once the last
eligible  person dies (after  some 80 years). Most reforms  will choose  a switching age among the
current working generation, say age 40, as a compromise between considerations to speed-up
transition and cash-flow  limitations.14
Figures 3a to  5a highlight  the  change in  the  composition  of the  total  public  pension
debt under  different  assumptions about the age of the  switching cohort  and over time.  The
decision takes place at the end of period 0 and the switch in period 1. Since the interest rate  in
this simulation is set equal to the growth rate, the overall debt level in percent  of GDP remains
unchanged.  Despite  the  fact  that  all  fiscal  requirements  are  debt  financed,  only  the
composition  of debt becomes different 7. The corresponding  b-Figures exhibit  the  cash-flow
requirements  of those changes: the operational deficit, the compensation for forgone unfunded
benefits  (paid at retirement,  or at death to the survivors when active), and the interest on  the
now explicit fiscal debt.
In  Figure  3, all workers  below  retirement  age shift  to  the  funded  (earnings-related)
scheme and are compensated for their accrued pension rights by recognition bonds (RB). These
bonds  earn  the  market  rate of  return  (equal to  the  rate  of  discount)  and  are  disbursed  at
retirement  (inclusive of the accumulated interest earnings).  The affiliation to the basic scheme
remains unchanged for all workers.  As a result, almost 2/3  of the SSD of the earnings related
scheme is exchanged against RB.  The overall amount  of RB decreases with  the retirement  of
each cohort  and the redemption  of each bond.  The  corresponding  cash flow  requirement  is
presented  in Figure 3b.  The expenditure consists of four elements:  (i) the  operational deficit
since the  earnings-related system  is left  with  no  contributors  but  all  retirees,  (ii) the  RB
disbursed  to  the  retiring  cohort  in  each year,  (iii) the value  of RB of  those  workers  dying
before retirement  (and for which it is assumed that this value is handed over to the family), and
(iv) the interest  on the now explicit fiscal debt.  It is assumed that all cash-flow requirements
are debt financed.  The total cash-flow requirement  is extremely front-loaded  and peaks in the
first year of transition.
In Figure 4, all workers prior  to the change remain with the old system and hence no
RB  are  required.  The  change  in  the  debt  composition  takes  place  between  SSD  and
accumulated deficits which consist of the operational deficit and interest  payments only.  The
cash-flow requirement  is very much back-loaded and peaks  after 40 years.  The transition  is
completed only after 80 years.
In  Figure  5, a medium  scenario is presented  since only  workers  41 years  of age and
below  switch to the new system.  Since their  acquired rights  under the unfunded  scheme are
relatively  low so is the level of RB issued for compensation.  Consequently  the  ,,recognition
bond  carrot"  is slim and long.  As a result of this  intermediate  switching approach,  the cash-
flow  requirements  are largely centered, peaking after 20 years (as in the  Hungarian  case, see
Palacios and Rocha, 1998).
Figures 3 to  5 demonstrate the trade-off between the speed of transition  and the timing
of the  cash-flow requirement.  The  faster the  envisaged transition,  the  more  the  cash-flow
requirement  is front-loaded.
Under  the assumption of the above simulation  - the  interest rate r equals the  growth
rate  g - no  deficit in the  economic  sense emerges from  the  UF-FF shift  since the  liability
7  Under the steady state conditions  assumed  in the model, the implicit SSD grows  with the national wage bill
(equal  to the growth  rate of GDP), while  the SSD  made  explicit  grows with the interest  rate if cash-flow
requirements  are  debt  financed.  This  leaves  the total  debt  in percent  of GDP  unchanged.15
position  of government remains unchanged. In  the  more relevant case of r  >  g a true
transition deficit  emerges  which is equivalent  to interest rate-growth rate difference  times the
SSD made explicit. 8 A capitalization  of that true transition deficit would make the financial
debt in percent of GDP grow without bounds, violating the conventional solvency condition
for government,  and thus has to be financed  by general revenue (discussed  below). In a perfect
foresight economy  this is the only deficit  which matters economically.
(ii) Cash-flow considerations are also important  for the timing of the disbursement of the
compensatory amount, if such a payment is deemed necessary.  The result in Figure 2 was
derived in  a  perfect foresight economy; however, under  uncertainty  and  risk  aversion,
individuals  may not be willing to  switch unless some compensation is provided (as done in
most  Latin American reforms so far).  The highest cash-flow requirement occurs  if the
compensation is paid at switching age. It amounts to  the disbursement and financing of the
corresponding  SSD  for all switchers,  but the financing of government debt instruments would
be  provided by  the  individuals receiving the  compensation amount  (or  their  financial
intermediaries  in which the money is invested). To my knowledge, no country has used this
approach. An intermediate  cash-flow  requirement takes place  if the compensation (inclusive  of
s In  real economies there is no single interest  rate but a whole  range of assets with  different  return-risk  profiles.
Measured against the risk-free return on government  bonds, the implicit rate/the  wage growth faired better  in the
period  of  1953-95  in the big OECD  countries,  except the  USA.  Compared with  capital market  returns,  a very
risky asset, the wage growth  was always much lower.  An  economic meaningful comparison  of r  and  g requires
appropriate  risk  adjustment of all returns,  which  is no  easy and  uncontroversial  undertaking.  But  comparing
capital return and wage growth without  such an adjustment is clearly misleading.
Average Real "Rates of Return" 1953-95
Germany  Japan  UK  USA
Wages growth  4.8  5.2  3.6  1.0
(variance)  - (11.8)  (37.7)  (8.8)  (6.0)
Interest  rate (10 year government bonds)  3.9  3.8  1.0  2.3
(variance)  (1.3)  (5.4)  (9.3)  (8.2)
Capital market return  - 10.1  10.8  10.8  9.8
(variance)  (689.5)  (612.1)  (638.6)  (333.2)
Source: Thompson  (1998),  Appendix  Table A.16
interest  payments) is paid only  at retirement  (such as the recognition  bonds in the  Chilean
reform).  In this  case,  -the payment  is distributed  over  the span of all switching cohorts  and
under  a  model-like  setting,  the  bonds  mature  with  each switching  cohort  retiring.  The
minimum cash-flow requirement  occurs if, further  on, the recognition  bonds are annuitized  at
retirement  (similar to  the  compensatory  pension  in the Argentinean  reform  or the  pro-rata
benefit in the Kasakhstan reform).  In this  case, the cash-flow requirement  is restricted to  the
sum of the annuity payments and spread to the year when the last pensioner dies. Thus, in fact,
the RB or annuity solution is equivalent to a forced credit by the switching individuals.17
Figure 3.a: Total Public Pensions Debt
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Figure 3.b: Cash Flow Requirements during  Transition
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Figure 4.a: Total Public Pension Debt
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Figure 5.a: Total Public Pension Debt
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Figure 5.b: Cash Flow Requirements during Transition
(r-g=p=2%;  switching  below  age  42)
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Special  cash-flow  requirements  occur  under  the  Mexican  reform  where  individuals  at
retirement  can decide to stay with  the funded provision  or take up benefits under  the (old but
reformed) unfunded  scheme while forfeiting the accumulated individual fund.  This  approach
frontloads  the  financing  requirements  since  contribution  payments  are forgone,  leads  to
inflows if the  public  benefit option  is chosen, followed  by  gradual outflows whose  present
value exceeds the prior inflow.
(iii)  The timing  of the reforms  of the unfunded  scheme linked with  the switch to  a funded
scheme is, in principle, of primordial  importance for the economic costs of transition,  and the
size and path  of the cash flows involved.  The  reform  of the  unfunded scheme serves, inter
alia, to  reduce the  outstanding  social security debt.  Consequently,  such a reform  should,  in
principle, be in place prior to  the  shift towards  the funded  scheme: This reduces the  implicit
debt to  be made explicit, and hence the fiscal flow requirements  involved.  Yet, the political
economy of pension reforms which  makes a concurrent  reform  of the unfunded  system and a
shift towards funded provision politically more palatable is likely to be the binding constraint.
The principle importance of an early reform is highlighted in Figures 6 and 7 under  the
assumption that the real interest rate is 5 percent  (i.e. discount rate and rate of return  of funded
scheme), and that the prices and real wages increase by 2 percent  p.a. (the latter rate is equal to
the rate of return from  the unfunded  scheme since no population  growth is assumed). In both
figures an identical reform of the unfunded  scheme takes place: an increase in the  retirement
age from  60 to  70 over  a span of 20 years/periods  (with  an increase by one year  every two
years for computational  reasons) and a reduction in the annual accrual rate from 1.5 percent  to
1 percent over the same time span. The only difF-ence  is the timing  of the reform. In Figure 6,
the reform starts 20 years before the switch to  the funded scheme, and hence is completed  at
the time of shifting from the earnings-related unfunded  to the earnings-related funded  scheme;
in  Figure  7,  the  reform  starts  concurrent  with  the  shift.  The  switching  decision  by  the
individuals,  and  hence  the  age  cohorts  concerned,  is  endogenously  determined,  with  no
compensation  paid.  This  results  in  a switch  of  all  cohorts  aged 44 and  below  under  both
reforms (since anybody aged  44 and below at the time  of reform anyhow retires at age 70).
Figures 6 and 7 indicate the  desirability of an early reform.  In Figure 6.a. - the early
reform scenario - the SSD (for both  the basic and earnings-related scheme) is almost halved at a
time of the financing shift, and the  SSD of the earnings-related scheme made explicit is a mere
42 percent of GDP.  The operational deficit (Figure 6.b) is frontloaded  and reaches a maximum
of some 2% of GDP  after 30 years; the true transition  deficit, which has to be budget-financed
in  order to  avoid an increase in  explicit debt rises slowly  from  slightly below to  above one
percentage point  of GDP. The slight initial fluctuations  are due to  the discontinuous  increase
in the retirement  age. This result contrasts with the late reform scenario (Figure 7). Due to the
parallel  implementation  of  benefit  and  financing  reform  the  SSD  continues  to  decrease
initially,  albeit slightly and remains  constant  once the  reform  is fully effective in  period  20.
The implicit  SSD made explicit amounts  to  almost  82 percent  of GDP.  Also, the operational
deficit and true transition  deficit follow  a higher path.  The fluctuation  in the latter are due to
the  discontinuous increase in  the  retirement  age (one  year every two  calendar years); while
keeping the total debt constant, this  reduces the budgetary  financing requirement  every other
year.21
Figure 6.a: Total Public Pension Debt
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Figure 7.a: Total Public Pension Debt
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V.  Assessing  the Options for Financing the Transition
An assessment  of the options for financing  the transition (the fiscal  requirements)  has to
take place against welfare economic considerations,  the assumptions about the environment
the  economy is working in,  and the  conjectured impact of different financing forms on
individual  labor supply and saving decisions. The central decision is the scope  and timing of
debt versus budgetary financing  for which guidelines  are provided. To this end, the structure
of this chapter is as follows: In a first part, the  issue of debt versus tax financing under
neoclassical  and endogenous  growth considerations  are highlighted;  in a second  part arguments
are developed  for a temporary debt built-up versus a rapid repayment of the implicit debt made
explicit;  in the last part, the financing of the Chilean reform is sketched-out.
Debt versus budgetary financing - the importance of externalities
(i)  In the neo-classical  world, an unfunded pension scheme is Pareto-efficient  even when
the interest rate permanently exceeds the natural growth rate if the given scheme does not
create economic  distortions.  Although only the first generation  gains  and all later generations
are worse off, there exists no mechanism to reverse  the situation and to improve the welfare
position of at least one generation (Breyer 1989). The result is intuitively and immediately
understandable, since it amounts to  an application of the second basic theorem of welfare
economics: any lump-sum redistribution of income entails an allocation which is different but
also Pareto-efficient  (Homburg 1990).  Hence, in the  absence of economic distortions, the
economic  effects  of debt versus budgetary  financing are thus easily  derived.
Under pure debt financing,  all the SSD  made explicit is added  to the financial  debt since
no debt repayment takes place.  As noted above, with  the interest rate above the  natural
growth rate a true transition deficit emerges  which describes  that part of the interest payment
on the now explicit debt that has to financed from the budget  to keep total debt in percent of
GDP  constant.  Yet this deficit does not constitute an additional burden since a financing
mechanism  can be established  which allows a transition in a generationally  neutral manner.
Shifting  toward funded provisions under the condition that the interest rate exceeds  the
wage  growth rate allows the purchase of the old benefit level with a premium below the prior
contribution rate.  Levying a wage tax in the size of this difference  provides revenues  which
exactly match the true transition deficit as highlighted in a simple numerical example in an
overlapping generations framework  (Table 4).  A  central assumption for  this  result  is
unchanged  labor supply (and saving).
Until period 2, the model economy runs an unfunded system, providing in old-age  a
replacement  rate of 50 percent of young generation wage which is financed  by a contribution
rate of 32.1  percent and implies a SSD of equivalent  size in percent of GDP.  In period 3, the
economy changes to  a two-pillar system with the  same replacement rate, of which  1/3 is
provided by the unfunded and 2/3 by a funded scheme. Since  the interest rate r is well above
the natural growth rate g (i.e. population and productivity growth), the funded pension can be
achieved by a lower premia rate.  With the transition however, a main share of the implicit
debt becomes  explicit, and with g  >  r results in a true transition deficit which needs to be
serviced. A wage  tax preempting  the difference  between the old contribution rate and the neW24
contribution rate phl. premia provides ex  -lv  the required resources.  In the unfunded system,
the worker pays a c  ribution  ate of 32.i percent. Under the two pillar system,  he pays 10.7
percent for the reduced unfunded scheme, 11.1  percent of premia for the funded system, and
10.3  percent wage  tax in order to service  the true transition deficit,  totaling the old rate of 32.1
percent.
Table 4:  Transition  to a two-pillar  System in generationally  neutral  manner
Generation  0  1  2  3  4  5
Single pillar unfunded system  Multi-pillar unfunded/funded system
(1)  young  (number)  100.0  120.0  144.0  172.8  207.4  248.8
(2)  old  (number)  83.3  100.0  120.0  144.0  172.8  207.4
(3)  wage  (average)  100.0  130.0  169.0  219.7  285.6  371.3
(4)  gdp  (1)x(3)  10,000.0  15,600.0  24,336.0  37,964.2  59,224.1  92,389.6
(5)  pension  (replacement  rate)  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
(6)  unfunded  (average)  38.5  50.0  65.01  28.2  36.6  47.6
(7)  funded  (average)  0  0  0  56.3  73.2  95.2
(8)  ssdebt  (2)x(6)  3,205.1  5,000.0  7,800.0  4,056.0  6,327.4  9,870.7
ssdebt  (in percent of gdp)  32%  32%  32%  11%  11%  11%
(9)  fiscal debt  0  0  0  8,112.0  12,654.7  19,741.4
fiscal debt  (in percent of gdp)  0%  0%  0%  21%  21%  21%
(10)  total debt  (8)+(9)  3,205.1  5,000.0  7,800.0  12,168.0  18,982.1  29,612.0
total debt  (in percent of gdp)  32%  32%  32%  32%  32%  32%
(11)  sscontribution rate  (8)/(4)  32.1%  32.1%  32.1%  10.7%  10.7%  10.7%
(12)  premia rate  (2/3)*0.5/(1+(d))  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  11.1%  11.1%  11.1%
(13)  wagetaxrate  (14)-(12)-(11)  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  10.3%  10.3%  10.3%
(14)  total rate  (held constant)  32.1%  32.1%  32.1%  32.1%  32.1%  32.1%
(15)  true transition deficit  (9)x[((d)-(c))1(1  +(d))]  0  0  0  3,893.8  6,074.3  9,475.9
(16)  wage tax  (13)x(9)  0  0  0  3,893.8  6,074.3  9,475.9
Notes:
(a)  Population growth per generation  20%  equal to an annual growth rate of  0.9%  1/
(b)  Productivity growth per generation  30%  equal to an annual growth rate of  1.3%  11
(c)  Natural Qrowth  per generation  56%  equal to an annual growth rate of  2.2%  1/
(d)  Finan_,_. market returns per generation  200%  equal to an annual growth rate of  5.6%  1!
1!  This assume the length of generation of 20 years.
Under  pure  budgetary financing (through  higher revenue or  lower  expenditure,
keeping  the sustainable  fiscal position  constant), the  government  combines  a pension  reform
with  a contractionary  fiscal policy.  The  latter  policy  reverses the  initial  intergenerational
distribution,  and burdens  the transition  generation  in favor of all future  generations.  In the
setting  of a traditional  OLG-model,  such a policy  causes first-order increases in  the level of
national  saving,  capital,  output  and  real  wages.  These  increases  rise  with  the  share  of
pensioners  in the population  and the degree to which the economy is closed, and falls with  the
prevalence  of voluntary  intergenerational  transfers  (see, for example, Schmidt-Hebbel,  1993).
While  output  increases, in neo-classic models with exogenous technical progress the additional
growth  is only transitory  until the new steady-state is reached.
(ii)  Still, even in this  neo-classic model world the costs of transition  can be reduced or even
eliminated under both  debt and budgetary financing if the new pension  scheme exhibits lower
negative externalities compared  to the unreformed scheme. Lower negative externalities can be
motivated  by  the  many  distortions  an  unfunded  scheme  may  exert  on  intertemporal
consumption  or on labor supply decisions, resulting in an excess burden.  Through  the UF-FF25
shift, the reduction or elimination of the excess  burden may be used to repay the implicit debt
of an unfunded scheme  within finite time (Homburg 1990). Since  public pension schemes  and
the way they are financed,  quite definitely  entail  numerous distortions,  a change in the funding
mechanism may thus actually improve welfare.  The conclusion rests, however, on  the
assumption that the funded scheme is less distortionar,y  for individual saving decisions  and
labor supply  than the unfunded one.
Simulation studies with  OLG-models  a la Auerbach-Kotlikoff  (1987) suggest  that the
welfare gains resulting from the  elimination of labor market distortions are comparatively
small. A model calibrated on the German pension system exhibits welfare gains of some 9
percent  of  life-time resources to  future  generations if  the  transition  generation is  not
compensated. With compensation,  the welfare  gains  to future generations  are reduced to some
2 percent (Raffelhiischen  1993). Simulations  by Kotlikoff (1996)  provide higher welfare gains
to  future  generations of 4.5 percent (while compensating the transition  generation) when
assuming  that the benefit-tax  linkage is low, that the initial tax structure features a progressive
income tax, and that consumption tax is used to finance the transition.  However, when the
initial tax structure is a proportionate income tax, the tax-benefit linkage is strong, when
income taxes are raised to finance the transition, and when the transition generation is fully
compensated, there is a 3.1 percent  welfare loss to future generations.
Deviating  from  a  general  equilibrium  framework  without  compensation  resuls
sometimes in estimations which suggest high future benefits bought by only  a small transitory
burden  (see, for example, Feldstein and  Samwick, 1996).  Yet these results need to  be treated
w^7ith  a grain of salt both with  regard to their  assumptions (such as the assumed very high rate
of return  from funded provisions) as well as their partial equilibrium nature.
(iii)  The  considerations in traditional  OLG-models  highlight  the critical  assumption for  a
Pareto-improving transition  in a neo-classical model setting, namely that the benefit-tax link of
the system to be replaced is weak,  and that general taxation  (income or consumption  tax) is at
the margin less distortionary  than  social security contributions  (payroll taxation).  This is not
necessary the case in a closed economy,  even less so in an open economy.  Furthermore,  the
net efficiency gain declines with the incidence of worker-consumption  myopia.
In  a  closed  economy  setting,  the  results  depend  on  the  particular  structure  of
preferences.  Simulation  results  indicate that  for  particular  parameter  combinations,  a  shift
between wage and income taxation  usually, but not always produce efficiency gains (Auerbach
and  Kotlikoff,  1987), and Auerbach,  Kotlikoff and Skinner  (1983) conclude from  second-best
theory that income taxation will not always be more efficient than wage or payroll taxation.
In  an  open  economy,  the  probability  of  net  efficiency gains is likely  to  be further
reduced.  With capital much more mobile than labor, the effective taxation of capital income is
reduced or even eliminated so that  the tax incidence falls essentially on the less mobile factors
of  production  (labor  and land).  In  consequence,  shifting  from  payroll  taxation  to  general
taxation as part of the pension reform  may not change the tax incidence and the distortionary
effects, only the way taxes are levied.26
The welfare economic effects get even more uncertain  if social security  contributions
are  used  to  finance  the  cash  requirements  of  transition.  Such  an  approach  is  under
consideration  in various countries of eastern Europe (see Holzmann,  1997b), and has recently
also been proposed  for  Spain (Pifiera, 1996). It  consists in  curtailing the  expenditure  for the
unfunded tier  (through  increase in  retirement  age and change in the  benefit  structure)  while
keeping the  contribution  rate  for  switchers  and  non-switchers  till  the  implicit  debt  made
explicit is repaid.  Since this approach  further  loosens the  contribution/benefit  link for  both
switchers and non-switchers, the excess burden of the wage taxation may even increase.
(iv)  Under a traditional  neo-classical  framework, the financing of an UF-FF shift is technically
feasible but difficult to  justify in economic terms:  the long-term  welfare gains are small and
can be achieved only  at the  expense of the  transition  generation  unless  net-efficiency gains
through  the corresponding shift in the mode of taxation are realized.  The likelihood  for those
gains, however, are small.  Thus, additional positive economic effects of such a pension reform
are  required  in  order  to  justify such  a  shift  in  welfare  economic  terms,  and  provide  the
necessary financing in fiscal terms.  They may be found in the impact on economic growth.
There are four main avenues a U.F-FF shift may introduce  positive externalities, leading
to  a higher growth  rate than otherwise: (1)  a higher and more productive  employment  level;
(2) a higher national saving rate;  (3) a higher rate of capital accumulation; and (4) a higher rate
of technical progress.  While effect (2) and (3) are identical in  a closed economy,  in  an open
economy they can diverge.  All four effects (or a subset) can interact and strengthen  each other
once considerations of endogenous growth are taken into account.
At the labor market  level, the type  of pension  scheme - unfunded  or funded  - and the
perceived link  between  contributions  and  benefits can  determine  the  distribution  of  labor
supply between the formal and informal  sectors.  If the latter  is less productive  because higher
transactions costs (e.g. bribes) or lower technology,  a pension  reform that  moves labor  supply
to the formal sector will enhance overall productivity  and in an endogenous growth  model can
lead to  a higher growth  path.  At  the financial market  level, a shift from  an  unfunded  to  a
funded scheme can promote  the development  of financ.il  markets,  by  making  them  deeper,
more liquid, and more competitive.  The resulting enhanced resource allocation  may lead not
only to a one-time efficiency gain but also to a permanently  higher growth  path.  The evidence
for the Chilean pension  reform can be interpreted  in this  direction  resulting  in an additional
growth of up to 2 percentage points p.a. (Holzmann,  1997b).
While  a higher  growth  path  allows the compensation  of the  transition  generation  in
accounting terms, and hence a long-term budgetary financing of the transition,  in actual fiscal
terms  the  situation  is still complicated  for  three  main  reasons: First,  the  enhanced  output
accrues to the private  sector.  In the absence of lump-sum taxation  and under  a constant  tax
rate to  keep the tax burden  constant  only  a share of the  additional  resources  accrues to  the
budget (around  1/3).  Hence, even with  gains in growth  rate of 2 percentage points  of which
some 0.6 percentage points go to the budget (compared to fiscal requirements  of 1 to 5 percent
of GDP  p.a.)  suggest a temporary  debt financing.  Second,  a higher  growth  rate  is mostly
linked  with  higher  returns  on  the  capital  market,  including  for  government  borrowing.
Hence,  in  order  to  contain  the  impact  on  fiscal requirements,  compensation  arrangements
which  fix the  interest  rate are required  (as done  in Chile  where the  recognition  bonds pay 427
percent  p.a. compared to  the  market  rate  of almost  8 percent).  Last but  not  least, a higher
growth rate leads to also to  higher pensions for those retiring  under  the old scheme leading to
a higher operational  deficit.  While this  effect could  be constraint  through  the provision  of
pensions according to the old growth path, this may prove politically difficult.
Debt  and budgetary  financing  -some guidelines
The  theoretical  analysis and the  likely  magnitude  of  additional  resources compared
with  the fiscal requirements  suggest a mixed financing with  the split determined by country's
circumstances.  The same applies to the  form  of budgetary  financing  (expenditure cuts versus
tax  increase), and  the  taxes  applied.  To  assess the  situation,  the  following  guidelines  are
proposed:
There are three main arguments for a temporary  build-up of explicit debt:
(i)  Intergenerational  equity  considerations  suggest  that  only  that  part  of  fiscal
requirements  is  to  be  covered by  budgetary  resources  which  is  derived  in  non-distortion-
enhancing  manner  from  additional  output  and  wage  taxes  on  the  difference of prior  and
current  forced saving rates.  The remainder is to  be debt financed  in order  to avoid a double
burden on the transition  generation.
(ii)  Independent of the double burden,  tax smoothing  considerations  suggest a constant tax
rate over the planning horizon and imply  a temporary  build-up of debt.  The argument is that
temporary  higher tax rates imply a much stronger  increase in the excess burden which makes a
constant tax rate welfare improving.
(iii)  Transition  economies reforming their  pension  system are mostly  also plagued with  an
inefficient  tax  system/expenditure  programs.  Raising  taxes  or  cutting  expenditure  in  an
unreformed  environment  leads to  an even higher excess burden.  Yet  improvements  on both
the  revenue  and  expenditure  side take  time,  suggesting  an  initially  higher  level  of  debt
financing until the reforms become effective.
There are also three main arguments for higher share of budgetary financing:
(iv)  While UF-FF shift does not change the level of overall debt, the financial market  may
react  adversely leading  to  a  higher  risk  premium  on  the  total  fiscal debt  - the  old  and
transition-determined.  Such a financial market  reaction  is not  necessarily irrational,  or  the
outcome of insufficient information.  It may reflect differences in the assessment of the default
probability with regard to both kinds of debt (implicit and explicit), and their interaction.
If  financial markets  perceive that  governments  will  never  default  on  their  pension
obligations  (i.e. introduce  a reform  of the  unfunded  tier  which  reduces their  commitments
towards  current  retirees  and  workforce),  with  a rising  SSD the  risk  of  a default  on  their
financial debt  should  increase since the  set  of policy  options  to  repay that  debt is reduced
(there  is less scope for  tax  increases, but  scope for  inflation  tax  since pension  benefits  are
typically  secured in  real terms).  Accordingly,  a  rise  in  the  SSD should  increase the  risk
premium  on financial debt, while a decline should  reduce it, and any UF-FF shift leaving the28
total debt constant would be inconsequential.  On the other hand, if financial  markets are
convinced  that governments  will first default on their pension commitment before defaulting
on  their  financial obligations, the  level of  the  SSD and  thus  any  change should  be
inconsequential  for the  imposed risk premium  on financial market debt.  In  such a case,
however, a reform of the pension system which reduces the implicit debt, but increases  the
stock of financial  debt, would tend to increase  the risk premium, with negative  impacts  on the
budget and the economy. If the default on both kinds of debt is considered  equally  likely, the
risk premium should be driven by the size of the total debt.  Hence, an undeveloped  financial
market  would suggest a higher budgetary financing to  free-up financial resources to  be
intermediated.
The apparent irrelevance of SSD for  risk premia on the  fiscal debt in the  past is
consistent  with the second conjecture  and a possible increase  in the risk premia once  the debt is
made explicit. This suggests  a stronger budgetary financing.
(v)  A high share of debt financing may slow-down the development of financial  markets
since the as-ets of the  emerging pens  - funds may be become  concentrated in government
debt instruments.  In a developed  financial market, even complete  debt financing  would not
imply that all additional  government debt has to and will be bought by  pension  funds since
other institutions and the private sector would also buy these instruments  for portfolio reasons
leaving room for asset diversification of the  pension fund.  In  infant  financial markets,
however, the government has an incentive to force the pension  funds to purchase  their bonds,
and the pension fund has an incentive  to buy given the absence  of other instruments. Under
such circumstances  the creation of other instruments by the funds will be slow, delaying  the
development  of financial  markets and its potential growth effects.
(vi)  There is growing evidence  that it is economic growth that primarily drives  the saving
rate of the private sector which only in a second round provides for higher and sustained
growth.  This inverse  causality,  however, requires an initial impact  to get growth started. Such
an impact may be derived from public saving as a result of a tight fiscal stance  to finance the
shift toward funded pensions. Furthermore, a tight fiscal stance  signals also credibility  to the
private sector and frees-up resources  for private sector investment. This also begs for a lower
share  of debt for financing  the transition.
To provide the budgetary resources  the following  main considerations  are suggest:
(vii)  International evidence from  growth  analysis and budgetary consolidation analysis
suggest  that at the margin expenditure cuts should be given predominance  to  raising taxes.
Lc-  r current expenditure are often favorably linked with high growth rates, and a tighter
fiscal stance as a result of expenditure cuts instead of tax rises has a higher chance to  be
sustainable.  While cuts in some areas such as subsidies can be easily implemented (albeit
politically difficult),  cuts in other areas such as in the public wage bill require concurrent
reforms of the public sector to be sustainable.
(viii)  Theoretical  models and some evidence for highly industrialized  economies  suggest  that
income taxes, or even more so general and specific  consumption taxes are to be preferred to
wage  taxes in order to raise budgetary  resources. Yet in countries  with weak tax enforcement29
the same  conclusions  do not necessarily  hold and the short-term decision  of what taxes  to raise
has to be based on local circumstances. Whatever  the conclusion,  in parallel with the pension
reform, or even better before, an improvement of tax administration  should take place.
(ix)  Moving to  funded pension raises the issue of which taxation model to  follow: an
expenditure tax-type  treatment (EET or TEE) or a comprehensive  income tax-type  treatment
(TTE*);  in general  preferences  is given to the former since  it reduces  distortions. Whatever  the
treatment, consistency  with similar old-age  saving  should be applied (which in many transition
economies  implies  that social security pensions  should be taxed). Yet, since an EET treatment
shifts the tax revenue to the future, and allows  some tax smoothing  for the individual,  variants
such as the TEE treatment should be seriously  considered (see,  Whitehouse,  1998).
The Chilean experience
No comprehensive  multi-country study is yet available  which covers the actual  or even
projected financing of the transition.  For the reform pioneer, Chile, the data suggest  the
following (Chart 9, and Holzmann 1997a):
(i) A pre-financing  of the reform took place. The fiscal stance  tightened a few years before  the,
reform in 1981  to make room for the envisaged  fiscal  requirements.
(ii) The tight  fiscal policy was strengthened with  the  implementation of the  reform and
resulted again  in a budgetary surplus as early as 1987.
(iii) The share of debt financing was very modest even during these early years - less then 2
percent of GDP in the peak year, compared to fiscal requirements of some 5 percent.  The
estimated  SSD  to be made explicit  is 126  percent (see  Table 2).
(iv)  The improvement in the fiscal  stance/the contribution of public saving  was exclusively  the
result of cuts in other current expenditure (linked with program reforms) since the current
revenue in percent of GDP decreased  almost continuously even  prior to reform.
Despite the  success of the Chilean pension reform the largely budgetary financing
cannot be taken as a clear example  to follow, but it is suggestive.30





-- 1  0  - \  \,  ,  I~~~~---------
.- 10
\  ',  .1N
-2 
\I.
-20  __  __  __  __
1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995
Current  revenue  Current  expenditure  - _  General  govemment  balance
- - --  -.- Public  enterprse balance  - - - Public sector balance31
References
Arrau,  P.  (1991):  La reforma  previsional  Chilena y  su financiamento  durante  la transition,
Coleccion Estudios CIEPLAN  32, June, 5-44.
Arrau,  P.  and  Schmidt-Hebbel,  K.  (1993):  Macroeconomic  and  intergenerational  welfare
effects of a transition  from  pay-as-you-go to  fully funded pensions, background  paper
for the World Bank Study on Old-Age Security, Washington, D.C., (mimeo).
Auerbach,  A., Kotlikoff,  L.J. and Skinner,  J. (1983): The efficiency gains from  dynamic tax
reform, International  Economic Review 23(3).
Breyer, F. (1989): On the intergenerational  Pareto efficiency of pay-as-you-go financed pension
systems, Journal of Institutional  and Theoretical Economics 145, 643-658.
Feldstein,  M:  (1974): Social security,  induced retirement  and  aggregate capital accumulation,
Journal  of Political Economy  82, No.  5, 905-26.
Feldstein, M. and Samwick, A. (1996): The transition  path in privatizing social security, NBER
(mimeo).
Franco, D. (1995): Pension liabilities - Their use and misuse in the assessment of fiscal policies,
Commission  of the European Union -Economic Papers No.  110, May.
Holzmann,  R.  (1994): Funded  and  Private  Pensions  for  Eastern  European  Countries  in
Transition? Revista de Analysis Economico, Vol 9, No.  1,  Junio,  183-210.
Holzmann,  R.  (1997a): Pension  Reform,  Financial  Market  Development,  and  Economic
Growth:  Preliminary Evidence from Chile, IMF Staff Papers 44, No.  2, June,  149-178.
Holzmann,  R. (1997b): Starting Over in Pensions:  The Challenges Facing Central  and Eastern
Europe, Journal  of Public Policy 17, No. 2, 195-222.
Holzmann,  R.  (1997c): On  Economic  Benefits and  Fiscal  Requirements  of  Moving  from
Unfunded  to Funded Pensions, in: The Future  of the Welfare State - Challenges and Reforms,
European Economy - Report  and Studies No. 4, 1997, 121-163..
Homburg,  St. (1990):  The  efficiency of unfunded  pension  schemes, Journal  of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics  146, 640-647.
Kane, C. and Palacios, R. (1997): Reporting the Implicit Pension Debt, World  Bank (mimeo),
August.
Kotlikoff, L.J. (1996): Privatization  of Social Security: How  it works and why it matters, in J.
Poterba (ed.), Tax Policy and the Economy.
OECD  (1996): Ageing in OECD  countries: A Critical Policy Challenge, Social Policy Studies
No. 20, Paris (OECD).
Palacios, R. and Rocha, R. (1997): The Hungarian Pension System in Transition,  World Bank,
2nd draft, mimeo, July.
Palacios, R. and  E. Whitehouse  (1998):  The Role of Choice  in the Transition  to  a Funded
Pension System, Social Protection  Discussion Paper, No.  9812, World Bank, September
1998.32
Pifiera, J.  and  Weinstein, A.  (1996): Una  propuesta de  reforma  del sistema de  pensiones  en
Espafia, Madrid (Circulo de Empresarios).
Raffelhiischen,  B.  (1993):  Funding  Social  Security  Through  Pareto-optimal  Conversion
Policies, Journal  of Economics, Suppl. 7, 105-131.
Schmidt-Hebbel,  K. (1993): Pension reform transitions  from state pay-as-you-go to  privately-
managed fully-funded systems, World Bank, mimeo.
Schmidt-Hebbel,  K.  (1995):  Columbia's  Pension  Reform  - Fiscal  and  Macroeconomic
Implications, World Bank Discussion Paper 314, Washington, D.C.
hompson,  L. (1998): Older and Wiser: The Economics of Public Pension, Washington.  D.C.
(The Urban Institute Press).
Van den  Noord,  P. and  Herd, R.  (1994):  Estimating pension  liabilities - A methodological
framework,  OECD  Economic Studies 23, 131-166.
Whitehouse,  E.R.  (1998):  The  Tax  Treatment  of  Funded  Pensions,  Social  Protection
Discussion Paper, World Bank, Washington, D.C.ISocial Protection Discussion Paper Series
No.  Title
9801  World Bank Lending for Labor Markets: 1991 to 1996
9802  Export Processing Zones: A Review in Need of Update
9803  Building an Environment for Pension Reform  Developing Countries
9804  Risks in Pensions and Annuities: Efficient Designs
9805  The Hungarian Pension System in Transition
9806  Government Guarantees on Pension Fund Retums
9807  A World Bank Perspective on Pension Reform
9808  Women and Labor Market Changes in the Global Economy: Growth Helps,
Inequalities Hurt and Public Policy Matters
9809  Financing the Transition to Multipillar
9810  Pension Reform in Britain
9811  An Alternative Technical Education System: A Case Study of Mexico
9812  The Role of Choice in the Transition to a Funded Pension System
9813  Unemployment Benefits
9814  Family Allowances
9815  The Quest for Pension Reform: Poland's Security through Diversity
9816  Getting an Earful: A Review of Beneficiary Assessments of Social Funds
9817  Supervising Mandatory Funded Pension Systems: Issues and Challenges
9901  Active Labor MarKet  Programs: A Review of the Evidence from Evaluations
9902  World Bank Lending for Labor Markets: 1991 to 1998
9903  A Bundle of Joy or an Expensive Luxury: A Comparative Analysis of the
Economic Environment for Family Formation in Western Europe
9904  Social Protection as Social Risk Management: Conceptual Underpinnings for
the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper
9905  The Effects of Legislative Change on Female Labour Supply: Marriage and
Divorce, Child and Spousal Support, Property Division and Pension SplittingSocial Protection Discussion Paper Series continued
No.  Title
9906  Optimal Unemployment Insurance: A Guide to the Literature
9907  Collecting and Transferring Pension Contributions
9908  Causalities Between Social Capital and Social Funds
9909  Russia's Social Protection Malaise: Key Reform Priorities as a Response to
the Present Crisis
9910  The Tax Treatment of Funded PensionsSummary  Findings
The  shift  from a PAYG  pension  scheme  to one  which is  fully
funded  ends  the  process  of  rolling  over  the  unreported  pension
debt  with each  new  generation.  To  the extent  that current
pensioners  and  workers  have  amassed  pension  rights  in the
old PAYG  scheme,  the government  will be forced  to borrow
or tax in order  to meet  this  obligation,  which is  often  larger
than  the conventionally  defined  public debt. This  paper
focuses  on assessing  the size  of the initial debt  that  will be
made  explicit,  reducing  it through  policy  measures  and
financing  the  transition  through  a combination  of debt  and
tax  financing. Producing  such  a strategy  is  a key  challenge
to pension  reformers  and  crucial  in determining  the success
or failure  of this  type  of reform.
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